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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jason A Hotchkiss appeals from the district court's order revoking his
probation and executing, without reduction, the sentences imposed upon his
convictions for two counts of grand theft.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In August 2007, Hotchkiss stole Kenneth Molleson's wallet and thereafter
used Mr. Molleson's financial transaction card to make three separate retail
purchases, totaling approximately $300.00. (3/12/08 PSI, p.2; 8/14/07 Incident
Report of Officer S. Ramirez, attached to 3/12/08 PSI; 8/15/07 Supp. Report of
Officer S. Winnings, attached to 3/12/08 PSI.) Hotchkiss also attempted to use
Mr. Molleson's bank account number to make an online payment of $1700.00
toward Hotchkiss' motorcycle loan. (3/12/08 PSI, p.2; 8/24/07 Supp. Report of
Officer S. Winnings, attached to 3/12/08 PSI.)
Over the next two months, Hotchkiss stole checks from the mailboxes of
numerous individuals, including Melvin Fouke and Samuel Jun. (R., pp.17-18;
3/12/08 PSI, p.2; 10/11/07 Incident Report of Officer S. Winnings, attached to
3/12/08 PSI; 11/16/07 Supp. Report of Officer J. Rhodes, attached to 3/12/08
PSI.) After taking the check from Mr. Jun's mailbox, Hotchkiss made the check
payable to himself in the amount of $5300.00, forged Mr. Jun's signature and
attempted to deposit the check in his girlfriend's bank account. (3/12/08 PSI, p.2;
10/11/07 Incident Report of Officer S. Winnings, attached to 3/12/08 PSI.)

1

The state charged Hotchkiss with five counts of grand theft. (R., pp.1618.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Hotchkiss pied guilty to the two counts in
which Mr. Molleson and Mr. Jun were victims, and the state dismissed the
remaining charges.

(R., pp.16-21.)

The district court imposed consecutive

unified sentences of 10 years with four years fixed on the first count, and 10
years with five years fixed on the second count, and retained jurisdiction. (R.,
pp.37-38, 40-44.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court
suspended the balance of Hotchkiss' sentences and placed him on probation for
10 years. (R., pp.58-73.) The order placing Hotchkiss on probation was entered
on June 1, 2009. (R., p.65.)
On June 29, 2011, Hotchkiss' probation officer submitted a report of
violation alleging that Hotchkiss had "not done well while on probation" and had
committed numerous violations, beginning as early as April 2010.

(R., pp.96-

100.) Specifically, the report of violation alleged that Hotchkiss had violated his
probation by incurring two new misdemeanor DWP convictions; failing to
maintain employment and repeatedly failing to attend a workforce readiness
class as instructed by his probation officer; failing to report for supervision on two
separate occasions; being discharged from two separate treatment programs
due to non-compliance and unexcused absences; and failing to make payments
toward his court costs, fines and restitution. (Id.; see also R., pp.74-78 (Motion
For Warrant For Probation Violation).)

Hotchkiss admitted the majority of the

allegations (R., p.145; 10/18/11 Tr., p.5, L.15 - p.11, L.7), and the district court
revoked his probation and ordered his underlying sentences executed (R.,
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pp.146-52; 12/19/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.14-17.) Hotchkiss timely appeals. (R., pp.15356.)
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ISSUES
Hotchkiss states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Hotchkiss due
process and equal protection when it denied his motion to
augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr.
Hotchkiss' probation and failed to reduce his sentences sua sponte
upon revoking probation?

(Appellant's Brief, p.5.)

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Hotchkiss failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated
his constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate
record with irrelevant transcripts?

2.

Has Hotchkiss failed to establish the district court abused its discretion
either by revoking probation or by not sua sponte reducing his sentence
upon doing so?
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ARGUMENT
I.

Hotchkiss Has Failed To Establish The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His
Constitutional Rights By Denying His Motions To Augment The Appellate Record
With Irrelevant Transcripts

A

Introduction
After the appellate record was settled, Hotchkiss filed motions to augment

with four unprepared transcripts.

(Motion To Augment And To Suspend The

Briefing Schedule and Statement In Support Thereof, filed August 10, 2012
("Motion").) The requested transcripts included (1) the February 4, 2008 change
of plea hearing; (2) the November 3, 2008 sentencing hearing; (3) the June 1,
2009 rider review hearing; and (4) the October 18, 2011 evidentiary hearing.
(Motion, pp.1-2).

The state objected to the preparation and inclusion in the

appellate record of all but the October 18, 2011 evidentiary hearing. (Objection
In Part To "Motion To Augment And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule And
Statement In Support Thereof," filed August 15, 2012.)

The Idaho Supreme

Court granted Hotchkiss' request to augment the record with a transcript of the
October 18, 2011 evidentiary hearing, but denied Hotchkiss' request for the
remaining transcripts. (Order, dated August 28, 2012.)
Two months later, Hotchkiss filed a Renewed Motion To Augment And
Suspend The Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support Thereof ("Renewed
Motion"), again seeking to augment the appellate record with a transcript of the
November 3, 2008 sentencing hearing.

(Renewed Motion, filed October 26,

2012, pp.1-3.) The state objected to Hotchkiss' Renewed Motion, and the Idaho
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Supreme Court adhered to its original decision denying Hotchkiss' motion to
augment the record with additional transcripts. (Objection To "Renewed Motion
To Augment And Suspend the Briefing Schedule And Statement In Support
Thereof," filed October 29, 2012; Order Denying Renewed Motion To Augment
And To Suspend The Briefing Schedule, dated November 9, 2012.)
Hotchkiss now contends that, by denying his motions to augment the
appellate record with the requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court has
violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection and has
denied him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's Brief, pp.616.)

Hotchkiss has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights

because he has failed to show that the requested transcripts are even relevant
to, much less necessary for resolution of, the only issues over which this Court
has jurisdiction on appeal.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).
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C.

Should This Case Be Assigned To The Idaho Court of Appeals, Hotchkiss
Has Failed To Provide Any Basis For The Court To Reconsider The Idaho
Supreme Court's Orders Denying His Motions To Augment
In State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _ , 288 P.3d 835, 837-39 (Ct. App.

2012) (review denied Nov. 29, 2012), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a
claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied the appellant his constitutional rights
by denying his motion to augment the record on appeal with various transcripts.
In doing so the Court "disclaim[ed] any authority to review, and, in effect, reverse
an Idaho Supreme Court decision made on a motion made prior to assignment of
the case to [the Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme Court
decision was contrary to the state or federal constitutions or other law."
_ , 288 P.3d at 837.

lit

at

Such an undertaking, the Court explained, "would be

tantamount to the Court of Appeals entertaining an 'appeal' from an Idaho
Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond the purview of this Court."

lit

The

Court, however, "deem[ed] it within [its] authority ... to evaluate and rule on [a]
renewed motion" if, for example, "the completed appellant's brief and/or
respondent's briefs have refined, clarified or expanded issues on appeal in such
a way as to demonstrate the need for additional records or transcripts, or where
new evidence is presented to support a renewed motion."

lit

To the extent this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Hotchkiss'
arguments fail to provide any basis for the Court to reconsider the Idaho
Supreme Court's orders denying his motions to augment the record with
additional transcripts that are unnecessary to the resolution of this appeal. The
Idaho Supreme Court has already ruled on Hotchkiss' Renewed Motion and
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Hotchkiss has not "refined, clarified or expanded [the] issues on appeal in such a
way as to demonstrate the need for additional records or transcripts," nor has he
presented new evidence to support renewing his motion to augment yet again.
Instead, assuming the case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, Hotchkiss is
merely asking the Court to re-evaluate the relevancy arguments that were
already presented to and rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court.

(Compare

Appellant's brief, pp.12-13 with Motion, pp.1-3 and Renewed Motion, p.2.) As
stated in Morgan, the Court of Appeals has no authority to do so.

D.

If This Court Considers The Merits Of Hotchkiss' Constitutional Claims, He
Has Failed To Establish Any Of His Rights Have Been Violated
To the extent this Court considers the merits of Hotchkiss' constitutional

claims, all of his arguments fail.

As in Morgan, Hotchkiss argues that he is

entitled to the additional transcripts because, he claims, the failure to provide
them is a violation of his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection,
and the effective assistance of appellate counsel. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-16.)
All of Hotchkiss' arguments lack merit.
A defendant in a criminal case has a due process right to "a record on
appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged
regarding the proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d
472, 477 (2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v.
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms
and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)); see also
Morgan, 153 Idaho at_, 288 P.3d at 838. The state, however, "will not be

8

required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts that "will not be
germane to consideration of the appeal."

Draper, 372 U.S. at 495; see also

M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996) (indigent appellant has right to "a
e

transcript of relevant trial proceedings").

Rather, an indigent defendant is

entitled, at state expense, to only those transcripts and portions of the record
necessary to pursue the issues raised on appeal. Griffin, 351 U.S. 12; Lane, 372
U.S. 477.

"[T]he State must afford [the indigent appellant] a record complete

enough to allow fair appellate consideration of his claims." S.L.J., 519 U.S. at
121. To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, the defendant must show
that any omissions from the record prejudiced his ability to pursue the appeal.
See State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968)
(distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). See also
United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2002).
Hotchkiss' appeal is timely only from the district court's December 18,
2011 order revoking probation and executing his underlying sentences and, as
such, that is the only order over which this Court has appellate jurisdiction.
(Compare I.AR. 14(a) (notice of appeal must be filed within 42 days of order
challenged on appeal) with R., pp.146 and 153 (notice of appeal filed 36 days
after entry of order revoking probation).)

The transcripts of the proceedings

related to that revocation decision, as well as the written materials relied on by
the district court in deciding to revoke Hotchkiss' probation, are all included in the
record on appeal. (See generally 10/18/11 Tr. (evidentiary hearing); 12/19/11 Tr.
(disposition hearing); R., pp.74-74-136 (7/5/11 Motion For Warrant For Probation
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Violation and attachments thereto); Exhibits (including 3/12/08 PSI prepared for
sentencing; 4/3/09 APSI prepared for rider review hearing; 12/13/11 PSI
prepared for probation violation disposition).)

Transcripts of the guilty plea,

sentencing, and rider review hearings are unnecessary because this Court lacks
appellate jurisdiction to review the orders that issued from those respective
hearings. More importantly, transcripts of those hearings were not prepared and
were not presented to the district court in relation to the probation violation
proceedings at issue in this case, and there is no indication that what was said at
those hearings played any role in the order challenged on appeal.

The

transcripts are simply unnecessary for appellate review of the only order within
the scope of this Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Hotchkiss argues otherwise, contending the requested transcripts are
necessary to ascertain precisely what he, the attorneys and the trial court said on
the record at the February 2008 guilty plea hearing, the November 2008
sentencing hearing and the June 2009 rider review hearing. (Appellant's brief,
p.12.) Specifically, with respect to the sentencing hearing, Hotchkiss argues that
a transcript of that hearing is necessary because, inter alia, "it included
corrections to the PSI, ... the contents of which" Hotchkiss claims are "unknown."
(Id.) This claim is specious. The PSI prepared for sentencing is included in the
appellate record and the corrections thereto, initialed by the trial court, appear on
the face of the document.

(See 3/12/08 PSI, pp.2, 10.)

Preparation of a

transcript of the sentencing hearing to ascertain what is already apparent from
the existing appellate record would result in an unnecessary waste of public
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funds.

Likewise, preparation of a transcript of the rider review hearing to

determine what additional programs trial counsel represented

Hotchkiss

completed after the APSI was prepared (see Appellant's brief, p.12) would be a
waste of resources because there is no indication that the district court,
adjudicating Hotchkiss' probation violations two and a half years later, relied on
anything other than the written record and exhibits, including all of Hotchkiss'
"PSls and ... prior PSls" (12/19/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.9-13), in deciding Hotchkiss was
no longer amenable to community supervision.
Hotchkiss' argument is necessarily that some argument or statement
made at guilty plea, sentencing and rider review hearings in 2008 and 2009 was
so influential at the probation revocation proceedings held in 2011 that transcripts
of the earlier proceedings are necessary to review for an abuse of the district
court's discretion. This argument is beyond speculative.

In fact, it is entirely

unsupportable because the record shows that the judge who presided over
Hotchkiss' probation violation proceedings in is not the same judge who, in the
earlier proceedings, took Hotchkiss' guilty plea, sentenced him and placed him
on probation following the period of retained jurisdiction. (Compare R., pp.19-21,
37-38, 58-64 (Judge Wetherell presiding over change of plea, sentencing and
rider review hearings) with R., pp.143-52 (Judge Wood presiding over probation
violation proceedings)). The current record includes all of the information that
was actually before the district court in deciding whether to revoke Hotchkiss'
probation and is more than adequate for appellate review of Hotchkiss' claims
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that the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation and ordering his
sentences executed without reduction.
Relying in part on State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 218 P.3d 5 (Ct. App.
2009), Hotchkiss next asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant and
necessary for resolution of his appellate claims "because Idaho appellate courts
review all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court
appropriately revoked probation." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) He also argues that,
without the requested transcripts, the record will be incomplete and his claims will
not be reviewed on the merits. (Id., pp.12-13.) Both of these claims lack merit.
In Hanington, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that, in reviewing a
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, the Court
"will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original
judgment" and review is based "upon the facts existing when the sentence was
imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the
revocation of probation." 148 Idaho at 28, 218 P.3d at 7. Contrary to Hotchkiss'
assertions, this language from Hanington does not require augmentation with
transcripts of all hearings from sentencing to the final revocation, nor does it
place upon the defendant-appellant a burden of including in the appellate record
transcripts never presented to or considered by the district court. As explained
by the Court of Appeals in Morgan, supra, such an interpretation of Hanington is
too broad. 153 Idaho at_, 288 P.3d at 838. The Court clarified that although
it "will not arbitrarily confine [itself] to only those facts which arise after sentencing
to the time of the revocation of probation . . . that does not mean that a//
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proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane."
(emphasis original).

~

Rather, "[t]he focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying

the trial court's decision to revoke probation."

liL Accordingly, the Court "will

consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the
revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on
appeal."

~

Because all relevant information is already included in the record

on appeal, Hotchkiss has failed to show any due process violation resulting from
the Idaho Supreme Court's orders denying his requests for augmentation.
Hotchkiss' equal protection argument also lacks merit.

The Court in

Morgan rejected the argument that equal protection mandates augmentation of
all transcripts the appellant desires, stating:
Morgan was not denied the transcripts because of indigency.
Morgan was afforded the opportunity to designate not only the
standard clerk's record, but also additional records necessary for
inclusion in the clerk's record on appeal. He had time to review the
record and make any objections, corrections, additions, or deletions
prior to settling of the record, pursuant to I.AR. 29(a). Morgan's
failure to fully and timely utilize the Idaho Appellate Rules, and his
failure to demonstrate the need for the transcripts in his motion to
augment the record, precluded him from including the first
probation violation hearing transcripts, not his indigency. Morgan's
motion to augment failed to make a showing that any appellant,
indigent or otherwise, would be entitled to the record as requested.
Morgan, 153 Idaho at_, 288 P.3d at 839. Hotchkiss' equal protection claim
fails for the same reasons.
Finally, the Court in Morgan also rejected the assertion that the denial of a
motion to augment the record on appeal results in the deprivation of the effective
assistance of counsel. Morgan, 153 Idaho at_, 288 P.3d at 839. Hotchkiss,
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like Morgan, "has failed to demonstrate how effective assistance of counsel is not
possible without the requested transcripts." lg_,_
Hotchkiss has failed to demonstrate that the requested transcripts are
necessary to pursue his appellate claims that the district court abused its
discretion by revoking probation and executing his underlying sentences.
Hotchkiss' speculative claims that he cannot have a fair review of the merits
without the transcripts do not establish a violation of his constitutional rights to
due process, equal protection, or effective assistance of counsel.

11.
Hotchkiss Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion

A

Introduction
Hotchkiss argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking

probation and ordering his sentences executed without reduction, "[i]n light of the
mitigating circumstances, including his continued sobriety, acceptance of
responsibility, and the fact that he committed no new felonies while on
probation." (Appellant's Brief, p.19.) The record supports the court's sentencing
decisions; Hotchkiss has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v.
Lafferty. 125 Idaho 378,381,870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)).
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C.

Hotchkiss Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion
In Revoking His Probation And Ordering His Sentences Executed Without
Reduction
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and

conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v.
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams,
115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114
Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to
revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the
goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.

State v.

Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122
Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327.
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original
sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule
35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing
Beckett, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977,
783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)). A court's decision not to reduce a sentence
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established standards
governing whether a sentence is excessive. Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218
P.3d at 7. Those standards require an appellant to "establish that, under any
reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the
objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104
P.3d 969, 975 (2005).

Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
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rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The reviewing court "will examine
the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment,"
i.e., "facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." Hanington,
148 Idaho at 29, 218 P.3d at 8.
Thirty-five-year-old Hotchkiss has an extensive criminal record, consisting
primarily of theft-related and driving offenses.
12/13/11 PSI, p.5.)

(See 3/12/08 PSI, pp.1, 3-9;

Before he was sentenced for the grand theft charges to

which he pied guilty in this case, he had previously been convicted of four prior
felonies - vehicle theft I, forgery II, theft Ill, and insufficient funds check-fraud and at least 25 misdemeanor offenses, including attempted theft, driving without
a valid operator's license (multiple convictions), DWP (multiple convictions),
reckless driving, DUI, open container, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
unlawful conveyance of articles into/out of jail. (3/12/08 PSI, pp.3-9; 12/13/11
PSI, pp.5-6.) He appears to have victimized strangers, acquaintances, friends,
employers and, perhaps most significantly, family. (3/12/08 PSI, pp.2, 10-14, 1618.) Although they declined to press charges, Hotchkiss' parents discovered
shortly before Hotchkiss was sentenced in this case that Hotchkiss had racked
up approximately $44,000.00 in credit card debt using credit cards he had
fraudulently obtained in their names. (3/12/08 PSI, pp.10-11, 16-17.)
Reflecting on Hotchkiss' criminal history, the presentence investigator
noted in preparation for sentencing that prior legal sanctions and treatment
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opportunities had neither deterred Hotchkiss from committing more crimes nor
protected society from Hotchkiss' unyielding propensity to "steal[] things that he
wants, but does not wish to work for." (3/12/08 PSI, p.17.) The investigator
explained:
Jason Hotchkiss has been a menace to every community he
has resided in. He began stealing as a juvenile and continued into
adulthood. He was sent to treatment centers, youth programs,
adult programs, has been in and out of jail countless times, been
placed on juvenile, misdemeanor and felony probation only to
violate the terms of his probation and have to be brought back in
front of the judge repeatedly. There has been little to no change at
all in Mr. Hotchkiss's criminal behavior.... [l]t would appear that Mr.
Hotchkiss has been out of control for many years and nothing has
seemed to cause a change.
(3/12/08 PSI, p.17.)
Despite the presentence investigator's observation that Hotchkiss had
"proven time and time again that he is unwilling to abide by probation
requirements" (3/12/08 PSI, p.18), the district court retained jurisdiction, thereby
affording Hotchkiss yet another opportunity to prove himself amenable to
community supervision (R., pp.37-38, 40-44). Although Hotchkiss did well in the
structured rider program and successfully completed all of his assigned
programming (see generally 4/2/09 APSI), the success was short-lived. Within
months after being placed on probation following the completion of his rider in
June 2009, Hotchkiss began "break[ing] the rules of his probation." (12/13/11
PSI, p.1 0; see also R., pp.96-100 (report of violation).) He failed to pay his court
costs, fines and restitution; was terminated from his job "for negligence" and
thereafter failed to work full-time or comply with his probation officer's repeated
instructions to attend workforce readiness and job classes; twice failed to report
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to his supervising officer as instructed; and was convicted of two new
misdemeanor DWP offenses. (R., pp.74-78, 96-99.) Hotchkiss' probation officer
attempted to work with Hotchkiss "in spite of his continued non-compliance"
(12/13/11 PSI, p.10), noting in the "Intermediate Interventions [and] Sanctions"
section of her report that Hotchkiss "had the benefit of a Retained Jurisdiction,
New Directions Aftercare, Moral Reconation Therapy, 3 times, increased face to
face meetings and a strict curfew of work, job search or treatment, otherwise he
is at home" (R., p.99).

Notwithstanding these interventions and rehabilitative

opportunities, Hotchkiss did not do well on probation and his "probation officer
had no choice but to go forward with a Probation Violation" after Hotchkiss was
convicted of the two new DWP offenses. (12/13/11 PSI, p.10.)
In deciding to revoke Hotchkiss' probation, the district court found that
Hotchkiss' violations were both "violations of substance" and willful.

(12/19/11

Tr., p.15, Ls.10-17.) The court also specifically recognized that its decision must
be guided

by whether Hotchkiss'

probation was

"serving

the

goal

of

rehabilitation." (12/19/11 Tr., p.15, Ls.17-20.) The court considered Hotchkiss'
expressions of remorse and his explanations for having violated the conditions of
his probation but found them unpersuasive, noting that Hotchkiss had offered "a
myriad of excuses" but demonstrated little to no actual compliance with several
fundamental conditions of his probation, including that he commit no new criminal
offenses.

(12/19/11 Tr., p.15, L.21 - p.16, L.24.)

Having concluded that

Hotchkiss' probation was not achieving the goal of rehabilitation, and noting that
the sheer volume of Hotchkiss' "PSls" and "prior PSls" also "demonstrate[d] a
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lack of effort to rehabilitate," the district court revoked Hotchkiss' probation and
ordered his underlying sentences executed without reduction.

(12/19/11 Tr.,

p.16, L.25-p.17, L.17.)
Hotchkiss argues that the district court should have continued him on
probation or, alternatively, should have reduced his underlying sentences
because he was able to remain sober while on probation, purported to accept
responsibility both for his underlying offenses and for his probation violations and
committed no new felony offenses while being supervised .in the community.
(Appellant's brief, pp.18-19.)

None of the "mitigating" factors Hotchkiss cites

demonstrate an abuse of discretion. While it is laudable that Hotchkiss appears
to have remained sober while on probation, his newfound sobriety did not deter
him from committing two new DWP offenses and otherwise failing to take
seriously other, equally important conditions of his probation, including that he
maintain employment, make restitution to his many victims, and make himself
available for supervision.

Likewise, while Hotchkiss claims to have accepted

responsibility for his criminal conduct and probation violations, the district court
found otherwise, concluding that Hotchkiss merely offered "excuses" and
demonstrated no real compliance or rehabilitative progress during his period of
probation. (12/19/11 Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.13.) Finally, the fact that Hotchkiss
"was not accused of committing any new felony offenses" while on probation
(Appellant's

brief,

p.19

(emphasis

original))

is

hardly

significant;

the

misdemeanor DWPs of which Hotchkiss was convicted while on probation
appear to be his ninth and tenth DWP convictions in a 10-year period.
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(See

3/12/08 PSI, pp.4-9.) That Hotchkiss twice chose to drive with a suspended
license while on probation and after having faced prior legal sanctions for
repeatedly engaging in the same conduct shows without a doubt, and regardless
of how the DWPs were ultimately charged, that Hotchkiss has no respect for the
law.
The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably
determined Hotchkiss was no longer a viable candidate for community
supervision.

Hotchkiss' history and character, together with his demonstrated

inability or unwillingness to comply with the law and the terms of his probation did
not entitled him to reinstatement on probation or to a sua sponte reduction of his
underlying sentences. Hotchkiss has failed to establish that the district court
abused its sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order revoking Hotchkiss' probation and executing his sentences without
reduction.
DATED this 8th day of February, 2013.
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